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Abstract
Drawing a random sample of ballots to conduct a risk-
limiting audit generally requires knowing how the bal-
lots cast in an election are organized into groups, for in-
stance, how many containers of ballots there are in all
and how many ballots are in each container. A list of
the ballot group identifiers along with number of bal-
lots in each group is called a ballot manifest. What
if the ballot manifest is not accurate? Surprisingly,
even if ballots are known to be missing from the mani-
fest, it is not necessary to make worst-case assumptions
about those ballots—for instance, to adjust the margin
by the number of missing ballots—to ensure that the
audit remains conservative. Rather, it suffices to make
worst-case assumptions about the individual randomly
selected ballots that the audit cannot find. This ob-
servation provides a simple modification to some risk-
limiting audit procedures that makes them automati-
cally become more conservative if the ballot manifest
has errors. The modification—phantoms to evil zom-
bies (∼2EZ)—requires only an upper bound on the total
number of ballots cast. ∼2EZ makes the audit P-value
stochastically larger than it would be had the manifest
been accurate, automatically requiring more than enough
ballots to be audited to offset the manifest errors. This
ensures that the true risk limit remains smaller than the
nominal risk limit. On the other hand, if the manifest is
in fact accurate and the upper bound on the total num-
ber of ballots equals the total according to the manifest,
∼2EZ has no effect at all on the number of ballots au-
dited nor on the true risk limit.
1 Introduction
Election results can be wrong for a variety of reasons,
including programming errors, hardware malfunctions,
voter errors, pollworker errors, ballot definition errors,
lapses in protocol, accidents, and deliberate fraud. Prop-
erly designed and executed post-election vote tabulation
audits can catch and correct errors in election outcomes.
The current gold standard for post-election audits is a
risk-limiting audit (Lindeman et al., 2008; Stark, 2008a,
2009a,b, 2010; Checkoway et al., 2010; Benaloh et al.,
2011; Lindeman and Stark, 2012). An audit is risk-
limiting if it has a pre-specified minimum probability of
progressing to a full hand count of the audit trail if the
reported outcome is wrong, no matter why it is wrong;
the full hand count then corrects the reported outcome.
Of course, for a full hand count of the audit trail to reveal
the correct outcome, the audit trail must be sufficiently
intact and accurate to reflect the correct outcome; a com-
pliance audit (Benaloh et al., 2011; Lindeman and Stark,
2012; Stark and Wagner, 2012) can assess the evidence
that this is true. And there must be an audit trail in the
first place.
Compliance audits (e.g., Benaloh et al. (2011); Lin-
deman and Stark (2012); Stark and Wagner (2012)) col-
lect evidence about the accuracy and integrity of the au-
dit trail to determine whether, as actually used in the
election, the voting system was strongly software inde-
pendent (Rivest and Wack, 2006; Rivest, 2008). Absent
strong evidence that the audit trail is sufficiently accu-
rate, a risk-limiting audit is mere theater, because risk-
limiting audits rely on the accuracy of the audit trail.
The combination of a strongly software-independent vot-
ing system, a compliance audit to assess whether there
is strong affirmative evidence that the audit trail is ad-
equately accurate, and a risk-limiting audit of the audit
trail, comprises a resilient canvass framework (Benaloh
et al., 2011; Stark and Wagner, 2012). A resilient can-
vass framework tends to recover from errors. If it reports
a winner, there is high statistical confidence that the re-
ported winner is the real winner.
Risk-limiting audits rely not only on the accuracy of
the audit trail itself: They also rely on the accuracy of
information about the audit trail, typically exported from
the voting system or compiled by the local election offi-
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cial during the canvass. In particular, risk-limiting audits
generally take these as given: the total number of bal-
lots, the organization of those ballots into groups, such as
containers of ballots, and the number of ballots in each
group. (Some auditing methods also require knowing the
reported votes in each group.) A listing of the groups of
ballots and the number of ballots in each group is called a
ballot manifest (Lindeman and Stark, 2012). Generally,
designing and carrying out the audit so that each ballot
has the correct probability of being selected involves the
ballot manifest.
While elections officials generally are quite good at
keeping track of paper, nothing is perfect: There are
benign exceptions1 and monstrous exceptions.2 Hence,
ballot manifests are sometimes inaccurate. The audit
could in principle re-count all the ballots in every group
and construct its own ballot manifest from scratch, but
statistics might let us spend less and still maintain the
risk-limiting property of the audit. How?
∼2EZ is a very minor change to two risk-limiting audit
procedures—ballot-level comparison audits and ballot-
polling audits Lindeman and Stark (2012)—that auto-
matically makes the procedures more conservative if the
ballot manifest has errors ∼2EZ ensures that the nomi-
nal P-value (loosely speaking, the chance of observing
sample results that favor the reported winner as much as
they do, if the reported winner were not the true win-
ner) is stochastically larger3 than it would be if the ballot
manifest had been known perfectly—so ballots had been
drawn uniformly and independently. This gives the audit
an even larger chance of leading to a full hand count if
the outcome is wrong and the manifest is wrong than it
would have had if the manifest had been right, keeping
the risk limit below the nominal risk limit.
We address ballot-level comparison audits (e.g., Stark
(2010); Benaloh et al. (2011); Lindeman and Stark
(2012) and ballot-polling audits (e.g., Lindeman and
Stark (2012); Lindeman et al. (2012)), both of which
seek to draw individual ballots with equal probability.
However, the same general approach can be adapted to
any sampling scheme so far proposed for risk-limiting
audits of plurality contests, vote-for-k contests, or con-
tests requiring a majority or super-majority. We do not
1In our experience, a few ballots from one precinct are sometimes
misfiled with ballots from another precinct, causing the manifest to be
off for both precincts.
2E.g., http://www.stamfordadvocate.com/news/article/
Bridgeport-vote-recount-shows-widespread-876032.php#
page-1, last accessed 8 May 2012;
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/
florida-countys, last accessed 6 May 2012;
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?
subjectid=11&articleid=20120501_16_A1_CUTLIN910968,
last accessed 7 May 2012.
3The random variable X is stochastically larger than the random
variable Y if, for every threshold t, Pr(X ≥ t)≥ Pr(Y ≥ t).
explore extending the method to ranked-choice voting
(RCV) or instant-runoff voting (IRV). We do not claim
that ∼2EZ is in any sense optimal. Rather, we show
that there is a very easy way to automatically address
some kinds of errors in the manifest, reducing the set of
things the compliance audit needs to check to ensure that
the resulting overall process comprises a resilient can-
vass framework (Benaloh et al., 2011; Stark and Wagner,
2012).
∼2EZ needs an upper bound on the true total number
of ballots, which could be provided by the compliance
audit or the local election official. (The number of reg-
istered voters eligible to vote in the contest under audit
is a weak upper bound; ballot accounting and counting
pollbook signatures give sharper bounds.) The compli-
ance audit also needs to ensure that no ballots were lost,
added, altered, or substituted—or to ensure that the num-
ber of such ballots is so small that it cannot alter the
outcome. And the risk-limiting audit needs to take that
number into account, treating the uncertainty in the most
pessimistic way (Stark and Wagner, 2012). If there is no
upper bound on the true total number of ballots, or if the
upper bound is too weak, the method we propose here is
not helpful—but we doubt any method could be.
The next few sections of this brief paper present spe-
cial cases and the general case of ∼2EZ. We start with
the case that the true total number of ballots, NO, is
known. (In this notation, O stands for “oracle”: We
imagine that an oracle tells us the true total number of
ballots.) We then examine the case that NO is not known,
but an upper-bound NU ≥ NO is known.
2 Ballot-level comparison audits and
ballot-polling audits
Stark (2010); Benaloh et al. (2011); Lindeman and Stark
(2012) discuss a simple method for ballot-level compar-
ison audits based on the maximum across-contest pair-
wise overstatement of margins (MACRO) (Stark, 2008b,
2009a) and a conservative simplification of the Kaplan-
Markov P-value (Stark, 2009b). The method compares
a human interpretation of the votes on ballots selected
at random (uniformly, with replacement) to the voting
system’s interpretation of the same ballots, continuing
to draw and examine ballots until there is strong evi-
dence that the winners reported by the voting system
are the true winners. The strength of evidence is mea-
sured by the P-value; smaller P-values are stronger evi-
dence that the reported outcome is correct. If the P-value
falls below the risk limit, the audit stops; otherwise, after
some number of draws, the auditors conduct a full hand
count, which reveals the correct outcome and overrides
the voting-system outcome if they disagree.
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A pairwise margin is the difference between the num-
ber of votes for any winner in a contest and any loser in
that contest. If the contest allows voters to select k of n
candidates, then there would be k(n− k) pairwise mar-
gins in that contest: Each of the k winners can be paired
with each of the n− k losers. In a typical plurality con-
test, k = 1; a city council or school board contest might
have k = 3, for instance.
Suppose that the human interpretation of the ballots
does not match the machine interpretation. Imagine cor-
recting the machine interpretation of the ballot to match
the human interpretation. Some pairwise margins might
not change; others might increase; and others might de-
crease. The magnitude of the change to any margin is at
most 2 votes.
If correcting the machine interpretation would in-
crease any pairwise margin in any contest under audit by
2 votes, the ballot has a 2-vote overstatement. If the bal-
lot does not have a 2-vote overstatement, but correcting
the machine interpretation would increase any pairwise
margin in any contest under audit by 1 vote, the ballot has
a 1-vote overstatement. If the ballot has neither a 2-vote
overstatement nor a 1-vote overstatement, but correcting
the machine interpretation would leave any pairwise mar-
gin in any contest under audit unchanged, the ballot has
a 0-vote overstatement. If the ballot does not have a 2-
vote overstatement, a 1-vote overstatement, or a 0-vote
overstatement, but correcting the machine interpretation
would increase any pairwise margin in any contest under
audit by exactly one vote, −1-vote overstatement. Oth-
erwise, the ballot has a −2-vote overstatement.
For instance, if there is any contest under audit in
which the machine reported a vote for the winner but a
manual interpretation reveals a vote for one of the losers
in that contest, the ballot has a 2-vote overstatement, no
matter whether or how any other (winner, loser) pairs are
affected. If the ballot does not have a 2-vote overstate-
ment, but there is a contest under audit in which the ma-
chine reported an undervote but a manual interpretation
reveals a vote for one of the losers of that contest, the
ballot has a 1-vote overstatement.
In this ballot-level comparison audit, the P-value de-
pends on the number of ballots in the sample with over-
statements of 2, 1, 0, -1, or -2 votes. Ballots that show a
maximum overstatement of 2 votes increase the P-value
most; ballots with a maximum overstatement of 1 vote
also increase the P-value, but by less. Ballots that show
a maximum overstatement of 0, -1, or -2 votes decrease
the P-value. Hence, substituting 2 for the actual max-
imum overstatement of any ballot in the sample cannot
decrease the P-value.
Ballot-polling audits (Lindeman and Stark, 2012; Lin-
deman et al., 2012) also draw ballots at random (uni-
formly, with replacement) and interpret the votes by
hand, continuing to draw ballots until there is strong evi-
dence that the winners reported by the voting system are
the true winners. Again, the strength of the evidence can
be measured by P-values—one for each (winner, loser)
pair. The P-values depend on the number of votes in the
sample for each candidate. Votes for a reported winner
decreases all the P-values for pairs that include that win-
ner; a vote for a reported loser increases all the P-values
for pairs that include that loser. Hence, treating a ballot
in the sample as if it simultaneously showed valid votes
for all the losers cannot decrease the P-value. (The rules
of the election might consider a ballot marked that way to
be an overvote, but that does not matter: We are talking
about the effect on the P-values, not how such a hypo-
thetical ballot would be tabulated.)
Both types of audits involve drawing ballots at random
with replacement from the ballots cast in the contests un-
der audit. In practice, this is carried out by considering
the groups in the ballot manifest to be in some canonical
order, considering the ballots in each group to be in some
order, and then conceptually numbering the ballots from
1 to the total number. For instance, ballot 1 is the first
ballot in the first group, ballot 2 is the second ballot in the
first group, and ballot 17,256 might be the 142nd ballot in
the 89th group (we call 142 the index of the ballot within
the group). We draw ballots at random by generating a
random number between 1 and the total number of re-
ported ballots, then use the ballot manifest to figure out
which ballot corresponds to that number. In this hypo-
thetical, if we draw the random number 17,256, we audit
the 142nd ballot in the 89th group. What happens if we
go into the 89th group, and discover that it contains only
140 ballots? Alternatively, what if we know that there
should be 23,000 ballots in all, but the manifest contains
only 22,371? What if we do not know how many ballots
there should be, but we are sure there are no more than
24,000, and the manifest lists only 22,371? How can we
conduct a rigorous risk-limiting audit in such cases?
It is perhaps obvious that if the errors in the man-
ifest were known—for instance, if we knew that ex-
actly 24000− 22371 = 629 ballots were not listed in
the manifest—assuming that there were an extra 629
votes for every losing candidate, adjusting the margins
accordingly, and auditing based on those adjusted mar-
gins would give a conservative procedure. What is novel
and (to us) surprising is that it is not necessary to adjust
the margins to account for those omissions. Rather, it is
enough to treat only the ballots that the audit attempts to
find but cannot find as votes for the losers (more gener-
ally, in the most pessimistic way) Even more surprising
is that it is not necessary to know how many ballots are
missing, only to have an upper bound.
In sketch, ∼2EZ is almost too easy: If a ballot cannot
be found (because the manifest is wrong—either because
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it lists a ballot that is not there, or because it does not
list all the ballots), pretend that the audit actually finds a
ballot, an evil zombie ballot that shows whatever would
increase the P-value the most.4 For ballot-level compar-
ison audits, this means pretending the ballot would show
a maximum overstatement of 2 votes; for ballot-polling
audits, this means pretending it showed a valid vote for
every loser (even though the rules of the election might
not allow that many valid votes on a single ballot). While
this clearly increases the P-value, the surprise is that it
increases the P-value by enough to ensure that the re-
sult is indeed conservative: We prove that the P-value is
stochastically larger than it would be if the manifest had
been correct. That is, we show that replacing “missing”
ballots by hypothetical evil zombie ballots compensates
at least enough to make up for errors in the manifest.
We now consider the cases described above in increas-
ing order of increasing complexity.
3 Case 1. NO is known
Suppose we know NO, the number of ballots actually
cast, for instance, as the result of ballot accounting and a
compliance audit. Let NM be the total number of ballots
according to the manifest.
3.1 NM = NO
If the total number of ballots according the the manifest
equals the true total number, then if some group has more
ballots than the manifest claims, some other group must
have fewer than the manifest claims. Suppose we sam-
ple a number uniformly from {1, . . . ,NO}, then use the
ballot manifest to try to locate the corresponding ballot.
If a group has more ballots than the manifest claims, we
will never sample it, because the manifest maps numbers
in the range corresponding to such ballots to a different
group. Conversely, we might look for a ballot in a group
and not find it, because its index within the group ex-
ceeds the actual number of ballots in the group. Suppose
that, if that occurs, we pretend we actually found a bal-
lot, and that the ballot showed whatever would increase
the P-value the most: an overstatement of 2 votes for a
ballot-level comparison audit, or valid votes for all the
losers for a ballot-polling audit.
We will call a group with more ballots than reported
a grave and a group with fewer ballots than reported a
hellmouth. In a grave, a ballot with an index larger than
4This is a related to the strategy Benaloh et al. (2011) use to account
for possible errors in the cryptographic mapping from disaggregated
votes to physical ballots. They assumed that the total number of ballots
in the mapping was known to agree with the total number of physical
ballots. Here, we do not necessarily assume that the total number of
ballots according to the manifest is the total number of physical ballots.
the number of ballots the manifest claims the group has
is dead: The sampling scheme will never select it. In a
hellmouth, an index larger than the number of ballots in
the group represents a phantom ballot—one that, appears
to be there in the manifest but is not there in reality.
Imagine taking the dead ballots from all the graves
and substituting them for phantoms, putting just the
right number in each hellmouth to make the true num-
ber of ballots match the manifest in every group. Then,
the chance that the sampling scheme selects each ballot
would be what it should be: 1/NO in each draw. The dead
ballots have been re-animated as zombies, replacing the
phantoms with real ballots.
Once the dead are re-animated as zombies, they be-
come evil: We suppose that they reflect whatever would
increase the P-value most—a 2-vote overstatement for
a ballot-level comparison audit, or a valid vote for ev-
ery loser in a ballot-polling audit. Thus, if an evil zom-
bie ballot is sampled, the P-value will never be lower
than was for the original votes on the dead ballot it came
from. Hence, the P-value is stochastically larger, and the
chance of a full hand count is higher: The risk-limit is
even more conservative.
Our strategy of treating ballots that the manifest says
should be there but are not there when we look is math-
ematically equivalent to substituting evil zombies for
phantoms. Hence, it is a conservative way to treat man-
ifest error when NO is the true number of ballots and
NM = NO.
3.2 NM < NO
Suppose NM < NO: There are fewer ballots in all accord-
ing to the manifest than are known to have been cast;
the manifest omits some ballots. If enough ballots were
omitted from the manifest to alter the outcome (i.e., to
erase some margin), careful (possibly forensic) investi-
gation and a full manual check of the manifest, if not a
full manual count of the votes, might be appropriate.
Otherwise, imagine adding a new group (a hellmouth)
to the manifest that contains the NO−NM phantom bal-
lots that are missing from the manifest. We now sample
uniformly from {1, . . . ,NO}.
If we draw a number greater than NM , that corresponds
to the new group that consists of NO −NM phantoms.
We don’t know what vote that ballot might have shown,
since we don’t know where to find it, but pretending that
it would show a 2-vote overstatement (for a ballot-level
comparison audit) or valid votes for all the losers (for a
ballot-polling audit) decreases the P-values by the max-
imum possible. That is, if we could find the ballot that
was selected, the resulting P-value would be no larger
than it would be for this substitution.
If we draw a number less than or equal to NM , we go
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into the appropriate group and examine the ballot. If that
ballot turns out to be a phantom, again we again substi-
tute a hypothetical evil zombie ballot that ballot shows
a 2-vote overstatement, for a ballot-level comparison au-
dit; or valid votes for all the losers, for a ballot-polling
audit. By the same argument as in section 3.1, the re-
sulting P-value is at least as large as it would be had the
ballot actually been where it was supposed to be accord-
ing to the manifest.
Again, transforming phantom ballots into evil zom-
bie ballots makes the P-value stochastically larger than
it would be for the correct manifest; hence, the risk limit
remains conservative.
3.3 NM > NO
If the number of ballots according to the manifest ex-
ceeds the number known to have been cast in the elec-
tion, this is prima facie evidence of ballot-box stuffing or
some serious problem. We suggest counting the groups
of ballots again and examining the ballots for evidence
of fraud. Careful, possibly forensic investigation and a
full manual check of the manifest might be appropriate.
We do not offer a statistical wooden stake.
4 Case 2: An upper bound NU on NO is
known
Suppose that we do not know the true number of ballots
NO, but we have an upper bound NU on NO. If NU < NM ,
this is again prima facie evidence of ballot-box stuffing
or another serious problem, so—as in section 3.3—we
suggest counting the groups of ballots again and inspect-
ing them for evidence of fraud.
If instead NU = NM (the upper bound is equal to the
number listed in the manifest), then, unless the compli-
ance audit has failed, NU = NO = NM and we are in the
case discussed in section 3.1.
Now consider the case NU > NM . The manifest might
have omitted ballots, possibly as many as NU −NM . If
NU −NM ballots could alter the outcome, again, care-
ful investigation and a full manual check of the manifest
would seem appropriate.
Otherwise, as in section 3.2, imagine augmenting the
manifest with a new group (hellmouth) of NU−NM phan-
tom ballots, ballots that might or might not exist, but
certainly are not listed in the manifest. We sample uni-
formly from {1, . . . ,NU}. If this corresponds to a phan-
tom ballot (either within one of the original groups or in
the new group), we replace it with an evil zombie: an
overstatement of 2 votes for a comparison audit, or valid
votes for all the losers, for a ballot-polling audit. This
amounts to treating the NO−NM actually missing ballots
and the NU−NO nonexistent ballots as if they favored the
losers. In effect, this decreases the margin. It increases
the chance of selecting a ballot interpreted to increase
the P-value by as much as possible and decreases the
probability of selecting a ballot with every other effect
on the P-value. This makes the P-value stochastically
larger than it would be if we were sampling from the ac-
tual ballots, increasing the chance that the audit will lead
to a full hand count. Again, changing phantoms to evil
zombies restores the risk limit, conservatively.
5 Discussion
Methods for ballot-level risk-limiting audits generally
assume that it is possible to sample ballots at random,
uniformly. To draw such samples, they rely on a bal-
lot manifest, a description of how the ballots are stored:
a listing of the containers of ballots and the number of
ballots in each container. If the manifest is wrong, the
sampling distribution will be wrong. If it is known that
a certain number of ballots are missing from the mani-
fest, one could simply assume that that number of ballots
would reflect votes that would reduce all the margins as
much as possible, adjust the margins accordingly, and au-
dit using the adjusted margins. That approach would not
help in situations where the number of ballots is correct,
but they are not organized as the manifest claims. More-
over, it is unnecessarily conservative when the number of
ballots listed in the manifest is wrong.
Instead, we propose Phantoms to Evil Zombies
(∼2EZ).∼2EZ samples uniformly, independently at ran-
dom from 1 to the upper bound NU on the total number
of ballots. It uses the manifest to (try to) look up the
corresponding ballot. If, according to the manifest, the
sampled ballot exists, but there is no such ballot in the
group, ∼2EZ substitutes a ballot with the worst effect on
the P-value for this phantom ballot. If, according to the
manifest there is no ballot corresponding to the selected
ballot5 ∼2EZ substitutes a ballot with the worst effect
on the P-value. We prove that this takes into account er-
rors and omissions in the ballot manifest in a way that is
guaranteed to be conservative: The nominal risk limit is
never smaller than the true risk limit. If the manifest is
in fact accurate and the upper bound on the number of
ballots is tight, ∼2EZ has no effect on workload, but if
the manifest has errors or possible omissions, it requires
the audit to look at more ballots—at least enough to at-
tain the nominal risk limit. Hence, we recommend that
∼2EZ be used routinely with risk-limiting audits.
5I.e., the random number is greater than NM , the total number of
ballots in the manifest.
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